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Treaty provisions on Democratic Principles 
According to the main aim of enhancing the democratic legitimacy of the Union in the Preamble, for 
the first time in the Treaties, the Lisbon Treaty includes explicit provisions on democratic principles in 
its Title II. Article 10 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) incorporates the most important 
democratic statements, which are complemented by a whole set of new provisions that increase the 
power of the most democratic institutions. These new reforms mainly strengthen the role of the 
European Parliament and the national parliaments, and provide for citizen’s initiatives, with the 
purpose of increasing the democratic legitimacy of the EU. 
The Treaties contain provisions aimed at reinforcing democracy in its representative and participatory 
dimensions: 1) Representative democracy, by empowering the most democratic institutions such as the 
European Parliament and the national and regional chambers’ participation and control with regard to 
EU acts; and 2) Participatory/Direct democracy, by establishing new participatory mechanisms, such 
the European citizens’ initiative, and new channels of communication and information with European 
civil society. 
 
The European Parliament (EP) 
The European Parliament is the most democratic institution of the EU, as its members are elected by 
direct universal suffrage of all citizens of the EU. Treaty after Treaty has progressively empowered this 
institutions as a way to democratise the EU, transforming it from a mere consultative chamber into an 
important co-decision institution for most EU legislation and for the adoption of the EU budget (art. 
14.1 and 16.1 TEU). Among other powers and rights given to the Parliament, the appointment of the 
Commission requires its consent; and it has the authority to establish temporary committees of inquiry, 
to receive petitions from citizens, to elect the European Ombudsman, to put oral or written questions 
to the Commission and to the Council, etc. Moreover, the Commission is responsible to the 
Parliament, which may vote on a motion of censure entailing the resignation of the Commission as a 
body (art. 17.8 TEU).  
A) The composition of the EP: As regards the members of the European Parliament (MEPs), 
there has been an important change in the wording of the provision which defines their 
representative role. According to the previous article in force, the MEPs were “representatives 
of the peoples of the States brought together in the Community” (art. 190.1 Treaty establishing 
the European Community (EC Treaty)). The Lisbon Treaty went one step further with regard 
to the concept of representation, establishing that the Parliament is composed of 
representatives of the Union’s citizens (art. 14.2 TEU), elected for five years by direct universal 
suffrage in a free and secret ballot. This new wording follows the democratic mandates 
underlined above, which stressed the importance of representative democracy (art. 10.1 TEU) 
and links with the idea that “citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European 
Parliament” (art. 10.2 TEU). 
The number of representatives has been increased from 736 (art. 190.1 EC as amended by the 
2005 Accession Act) to 751 (art. 14.2 TEU). Furthermore, the Treaty establishes some rules for 
the allocation of MEPs among Member States: “representation of citizens shall be degressively 
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proportional, with a minimum threshold of six members per Member State. No Member State 
shall be allocated more than ninety-six seats.” These rules favour the position of the smaller 
Member States in the EP since, as a result, they produce unbalanced representation. The 
German Federal Constitutional Court criticized this aspect of the Lisbon Treaty in its judgment 
of 30 of June 2009: “The result is that the weight of the vote of a citizen from a Member State 
with a low number of inhabitants may be about twelve times the weight of the vote of a citizen 
from a Member State with a [large population]” (paragraph 284 of the judgment). According to 
these rules, the European Council has to determine by unanimity, on the initiative of the 
Parliament, the future composition of the latter institution and the number of MEPs that 
corresponds to each Member State. 
B) Empowerment of the EP: 
1) Extension in the scope of co-decision: According to article 289 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), co-decision has become the ‘ordinary 
legislative procedure’, which consists of the joint adoption by the European Parliament and 
the Council of a regulation, directive or decision on a proposal from the Commission. The 
co-decision process has been extended to about thirty more policy and legal areas, and there 
are fourteen new legal bases where the Council applies QMV and the co-decision procedure 
is used. The most significant fields of extension are Freedom, Security and Justice, the co-
ordination of social security for migrant workers, structural funds, culture, European 
administration, and amendments to the Statute of the Court of Justice, among others. 
The procedure of co-decision is defined in article 294 TFEU. This article provides for a 
system of first and second readings of Commission proposals to discuss and agree the 
adoption the legislative drafts, and resort to the Conciliation Committee where an 
agreement has not been adopted in the second reading. While co-decision was introduced 
to make EU decision-making more inclusive, accountable and transparent, the procedure 
has instead increased informalisation and seclusion from the electorate and from rank-and-
file parliamentarians. This is the result of the organisation of informal meetings or 
‘trilogues’ between the Council Presidency, the Commission’s representatives and the 
European Parliament’s Rapporteur. These meetings are intended to reduce delays in the 
legislative procedure by avoiding time-consuming second readings and the need to resort to 
the Conciliation Committee. In the trilogues, where successful, the key interlocutors 
informally adopt texts that are later officially approved by co-decision, allowing for an early 
agreement at first reading. 
2) Control of the implementation powers of the Commission in comitology - Delegated 
and implementing acts: Committees of Member State officials have implemented much 
EU legislation with limited transparency and democratic control. These deficiencies have 
been partially overcome with the revision of the Second Comitology Decision in 2006. The 
revised Decision introduced a new regulatory procedure (‘regulatory procedure with 
scrutiny’) in which both the EP and the Council have the ability to block the adoption of 
proposals that emerge from committees. As a main consequence of this reform, the 
Commission and the Council have been more willing to rely on extensive delegation as a 
means to circumvent the influence of the EP on the regulation process. The EP reacted by 
restricting the scope of delegation instead of opposing delegation as such, and used its 
opposition to gain more leverage on the comitology process. 
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This democratic control of the EP over the comitology process has been implemented with 
the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, which distinguishes between two kinds of non-legislative 
acts, namely: 
- Delegated acts: The Lisbon Treaty replaces “comitology” (art. 202 EC) with “delegated 
acts”. The EP plays a role in the monitoring and control of delegated powers to the 
Commission when the latter adopts non-legislative acts of general application to 
supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of the legislative act (art. 290 
TFEU). The EP, together with the Council, retains the option of objecting to or 
revoking the delegation. 
Despite the adoption of the new Treaty, comitology – at least where management or 
regulatory committees are concerned – still has no clear legal status. The committees are 
in legal limbo since: a) the TFEU does not mention such committees, and b) the 
comitology procedures introduced by the Second Comitology Decision have not yet 
been adapted to the new institutional parity between the Council and the EP with 
regard to the control of the delegated acts based on article 290 TFEU. The legal status 
of comitology in relation to delegated acts may ultimately have to be clarified by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
- Implementing acts: where uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union 
acts are needed, the EP has been given a co-decision power for the adoption of the 
rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of 
the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (art. 291 TFEU). 
3) Legislative initiative: The Treaty, as in former Treaties, enables the EP to call on the 
Commission to submit any appropriate proposal on matters concerning which the EP 
considers that a Union act is required in order to implement the Treaties (art. 225 TFEU). 
If the Commission does not submit such a proposal, it must inform the EP of the reasons. 
4) Appointment of the Commission: The EP has the power to elect the President of the 
Commission, and to approve the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy and the other members of the Commission (art. 17.7 TEU). In the case of 
the President, a candidate is proposed to the EP by the European Council, which acts by 
QMV, taking into account the elections to the EP and after having held the appropriate 
consultations. The EP elects the candidate by a majority of its component members. If the 
candidate does not obtain the required majority, the European Council, again acting by 
QMV, must within a month propose a new candidate to be elected by the European 
Parliament following the same procedure (art. 17.7 TEU). This is an important change in 
the power of the EP if we consider that, under art. 214.2 EC, the nomination had to be 
approved by the European Parliament. 
5) EU budget: The powers of the EP have increased in relation to the budget procedure, as it 
now co-decides with the Council on all expenditures (art. 314 TFEU). This implies the 
elimination of so-called ‘compulsory expenditures’, that is, expenditures on which the 
Council had the last word. 
6) International agreements: The areas in which the European Council must obtain the 
consent of or at least consult the EP prior to the conclusion of an international agreement 
have been enlarged (art. 218.6 TFEU). Furthermore, the EP must be kept informed at all 
stages of the negotiation of international agreements (art. 218.10 TFEU). 
7) European External Action Service (EEAS): The Council is required to consult the EP 
on the organisation and functioning of the EEAS (art. 27.3 TEU). 
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8) Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Together with the national parliaments, the EP 
has been given the competence for scrutinising or evaluating the content, development and 
results of the evaluation system of the implementation of FSJ policies by Member States 
(art. 70 TFEU), and for scrutinising the activities of Europol (art. 88.2 TFEU) and Eurojust 
(art. 85.1 TFEU). 
9) Flexibility clause: Whereas art. 308 EC only required consultation of the EP where the 
Council adopted legal acts on the basis of the ‘flexibility clause’, following the Lisbon 
reform, art. 352 TFEU now conditions the adoption of such acts on the consent of the EP. 
10) Revision of the Treaties: The EP may submit to the Council proposals for the 
amendment of the Treaties, by means of either the ordinary revision procedure or the 
simplified procedures (art. 48 TEU). 
11) Withdrawal of a Member State from the Union: in this eventuality, the Council 
concludes an agreement on behalf of the Union with the withdrawing Member State, after 
obtaining the consent of the European Parliament (art. 50.2 TEU). 
 
European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI): 
According to article 10.3 TEU, which provides that every citizen shall have the right to participate in 
the democratic life of the Union, the Lisbon Treaty, for the first time, establishes the right to directly 
participate in or influence the EU decision-making process, in particular by means of the “citizens’ 
initiative”. Article 11.4 TEU offers some guidelines for the implementation and exercise of this 
mechanism: “Not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant number of Member 
States may take the initiative of inviting the European Commission, within the framework of its 
powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the 
Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties”. Hence, the ECI has two important 
features. First, to be valid the initiative requires at least one million signatures coming from a significant 
number of Member States. Second, the Commission, after checking whether the request falls within the 
limits of the powers conferred by the Treaties, is invited to make a proposal on the basis of the ECI. 
The Treaties call on the EP and the Council, acting by the ordinary legislative procedure, to adopt the 
procedures and conditions required for a citizens' initiative, such as the minimum number of Member 
States from which signatures must be collected for the ECI (art. 24 TFEU), and other details such as: 
the minimum number of signatures per Member State, which citizens are able to join the ECI, the 
procedures and so on. The European Parliament did in fact adopt guidelines relating to these matters in 
its resolution of 15 December 2010.1 Among other important features, the resolution makes some 
specific requests: 
‐ The initiative should require the support of at least one million eligible signatories coming from 
at least one quarter of all Member States to be valid. The signatories and organisers would 
have to be citizens of the Union and they would have to old enough to vote in EP elections. 
‐ The ECI should be initiated and submitted by a citizens’ committee of at least seven persons 
who are residents of at least seven different Member States. By way of exception, MEPs are 
                                                             
1 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7‐TA‐2010‐0480&language=EN&ring=A7‐
2010‐0350#BKMD‐16. 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not counted for the purposes of reaching the minimum number required forming a citizens’ 
committee. 
‐ The signatures collected must include at least those of the minimum number of citizens. The 
minimum number should correspond to the number of the Members of the European 
Parliament elected in each Member State, multiplied by 750. 
‐ After receiving the proposal, the Commission would have to indicate the action it intends to 
take, if any, and its reasons, to the organisers and to the European Parliament and the 
Council; that information would have to be made public. 
‐ The organisers should be given the opportunity to present the citizens’ initiative at a public 
hearing. The Commission and the European Parliament would have to ensure that this 
hearing is organised following a specified procedure. The hearing would be organised at the 
European Parliament, if appropriate together with such other institutions and bodies of the 
Union as may wish to participate, and the Commission would be represented at an appropriate 
level. 
 
Participation and influence of citizens, associations and civil society in EU 
decision- making: 
In order to facilitate the participation of European civil society and citizens, the Treaties have 
established additional obligations for EU institutions to promote openness, transparency, and the 
dissemination of information. These general principles are confirmed in article 10.3 TEU, which states 
that every citizen has the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union, and for that purpose 
EU decisions must be taken openly and as closely as possible to the citizens. 
- Involvement and dialogue with civil society in EU decision-making (art. 11 TEU): Under art. 
11 TEU, the EU institutions are required to inform citizens and representative associations, and they 
must publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action. The same article contains an explicit 
mandate for the European Commission to consult with parties concerned in order to ensure that the 
Union's actions are coherent and transparent. Finally, article 17.3 TFEU recognises that the EU 
respects churches and religious associations or communities as well as philosophical and non-
confessional organisations, and it encourages the EU institutions to maintain an open, transparent and 
regular dialogue with these churches and organisations. 
- Dialogue and public debates (arts. 15 and 16 TFEU): Articles 15 and 16 TFEU reinforce the idea 
of good governance and require the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies to ensure 
participation and political debate on EU issues in civil society. For that purpose, the EP (art. 15.2 TEU) 
and the Council (art. 16.8 TEU) are obliged to meet in public when considering and voting on a draft 
legislative act. Finally, the Treaty acknowledges a right of access of civil society to the documents of EU 
institutions under the procedure laid down for this purpose. Article 298 TFEU also provides that the 
EU institutions, in carrying out their activities, shall have the support of “an open, efficient and 
independent European administration”. 
- Citizens’ democratic rights (arts. 20.2 b) and d), 24, 227 and 228 TFEU): Various Treaty articles 
list the different rights that EU citizens enjoy, including the right to vote in European Elections, and 
other rights such as the right to petition the EP, the right to apply to the European Ombudsman, the 
right to address the institutions and advisory bodies of the Union in any of the Treaty languages (and 
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the right to obtain a reply in the same language). All of these rights were previously established in the 
EC Treaty (arts. 19-21, 194-195). Also relevant in relation to citizens’ rights is Title V (especially arts. 
39-44) of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, which bind the institutions, bodies and offices 
and agencies of the EU and bind the Member States when they implement EU law.     
 
European Commission: 
The Commission, in accordance with its mandate of maintaining an open, transparent and regular 
dialogue with representative associations and civil society, is required to carry out broad consultations 
with parties concerned in order to ensure that the Union's actions are coherent and transparent (art. 
11.3 TEU). 
 
Council 
To improve public debate, and to keep the public better informed about the progress or merits of a 
particular legislative draft, the TEU states, for the first time, that the Council has to meet in public 
when it deliberates and votes on a draft legislative act (art. 16.8 TEU). This article should also be seen 
in the light of all the previous improvements and efforts that the Council made to increase its 
transparency and openness in Regulation 1049/2001 regarding public access to EP, Council and 
Commission documents, and in the light of the Council’s Rules of Procedure, adopted on 1 December 
2009. 
Nevertheless, the most important reform with respect to the Council concerns the new method (to take 
effect on 1 November 2014) for calculating Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) when the Council ‘votes’ 
(although decisions in practice are often taken without counting votes) according to that decision rule. 
QMV is governed by article 16 TEU and article 238 TFEU (and article 235.1 TFEU for the European 
Council). The new system makes the allocation of votes more proportional to the population of the 
Member States, reflecting an image of the Council as being a union of both states and citizens. When 
the Council votes by QMV, each Member State is given an appropriate number of votes according to 
its population. This may be seen as improving the democratic representativeness of votes and of 
decision-making. 
The system is a departure from the weighted votes currently attributed to each Member States, as it will 
be based on a “double majority” with two thresholds: at least 55% of the members of the Council, 
comprising at least fifteen of them and collectively representing at least 65% of the population of the 
Union. A ‘blocking minority’ must include at least four Member States which represent more than 35% 
of the population of the participating Member States. The minimum number of four is meant to avoid 
obstruction by three large Member States acting alone, which together may account for more than 35% 
of the Union’s population. Where the Council does not act on a proposal from the Commission or 
from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, a qualified majority 
under the (future) double majority system is defined as at least 72% of the participating Member States, 
comprising at least 65% of the population of these States. 
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European Council 
Article 18.1 TEU integrates the European Council within the EU institutional structures and recognises 
the democratic accountability of its members in article 10.2: “Member States are represented in the 
European Council by their Heads of State or Government and in the Council by their governments, 
themselves democratically accountable either to their national Parliaments, or to their citizens.” 
 
Committee of the Regions (CoR): 
The Committee of the Regions (CoR) is an advisory body that assists the Council and the Commission, 
and is composed of representatives of regional and local bodies. This Committee, which gives voice in 
EU policy development and EU legislation to the different regions and their citizens, has been 
strengthened to some degree by the Lisbon Treaty. The CoR now has the right to bring actions before 
the ECJ for the annulment of EU legislative acts where the subsidiarity principle has been infringed, 
provided that the matter concerns an act predicated on consultation of the CoR (art. 8 of Protocol no. 
2). The CoR may also bring actions for annulment to protect its prerogatives (art. 263 TFEU). 
 
National Parliaments: 
As a response to national parliaments’ demands for more democratic legitimacy for the EU, the Lisbon 
Treaty has conferred a number of new rights and powers to the national parliaments in order to make 
the EU institutions more democratically accountable. These rights can be grouped as: (1) ‘information 
rights’, i.e., the right to receive information directly from the EU institutions (and not only from their 
governments), (2) the right to object  to EU acts on grounds of subsidiarity (art. 5 and Protocol 2), and 
(3) participation rights. These powers are acknowledged in article 12 TEU and developed in the 
Protocol no. 1 on the role of national parliaments in the EU and Protocol no. 2 on the application of 
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. The new powers of the national parliaments are 
summarised below. 
1) Direct information from EU institutions: National parliaments receive information directly 
from the EU institutions as regards not only EU legislative acts (art. 12.a TEU) but also EU 
legislative programmes, consultative documents from the Commission on legislative matters, 
Council minutes of its deliberations on legislative acts and the annual report of the Court of 
Auditors (Protocol no. 1, on the role of National Parliaments in the European Union).  
2) Subsidiarity control: After receiving information concerning draft legislation, national 
parliaments have the opportunity to review compliance of Commission proposals with the 
principle of subsidiarity, that is, in areas which do not fall within the exclusive competence of 
the EU, insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved at the 
level of the Member States or regional or local level (art. 5.3 TEU). The national chambers have 
8 weeks to send a reasoned opinion to the EU institutions explaining why the draft legislation 
does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. The Lisbon Treaty included two cooperative 
mechanisms to achieve better control of subsidiarity: 
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a) “Yellow card” mechanism: This system is activated if such a reasoned opinion is submitted 
which represents one-third of the total number of votes allocated to national parliaments2 
(or a quarter of the votes in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice). In that case, the 
Commission must review its proposal, and it must give reasons explaining  its decision to 
keep, change or withdraw the proposal (art. 7(2) of Protocol no.2). 
b) “Red card” mechanism: is only applicable to co-decision proposals and is activated when a 
simple majority of national parliaments complain (27 votes out of 54). The procedure is 
identical to the yellow card procedure, with the addition that, if the Commission wants to 
maintain the proposal it should send a justified opinion to the European Parliament and the 
Council, which will carry out a final subsidiarity review. The proposal is not given further 
consideration if either the Council (by a majority of 55% of the members) or a majority in 
the European Parliament consider that the proposal is incompatible with the principle of 
subsidiarity (art. 7(3) of Protocol no.2). 
c) Action for annulment by the European Court of Justice (ECJ): The Treaty establishes the 
jurisdiction of the ECJ to review the legality of EU legislation acts on grounds of 
infringement of the principle of subsidiarity by an EU legislative act, and enables national 
parliaments to initiate this process. Once the EU institutions adopt legislation, national 
parliaments (if so allowed by national law) can ask for an ex post review by the ECJ. Such 
actions may be brought by Member States, or notified by them in accordance with their 
legal order on behalf of their national Parliament, or a chamber thereof (art. 8 of Protocol 
no.2). 
3) Scrutiny of acts in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice (FSJ): In this specific field, national 
parliaments, together with the EP, should be informed of the content, development and results 
of the evaluation system of the implementation of FSJ policies by Member States (art. 70 
TFEU). Furthermore, they are authorised to scrutinize the activities of Europol (art. 88.2 
TFEU) and of Eurojust (art. 85.1 TFEU). For this purpose, the European Parliament and 
national parliaments are to be kept informed in accordance with a system laid down in a 
separate a regulation. Regarding family law with cross-border implications, where the Council 
can adopt acts by unanimity, the Council itself, on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the EP, may adopt a decision determining those aspects of family law with cross-
border implications which may be the subject of acts adopted by the ordinary legislative 
procedure. The adoption of this so-called “passerelle clause” by the Council changes the 
procedure for adopting legislation from a special legislative procedure to the ordinary legislative 
procedure. However, the Lisbon Treaty also introduced a mechanism of control in relation to 
the passerelle clause by providing that the proposal must be notified to the national parliaments, 
which then have the right to object (art. 81.3 TFEU). 
4) Role of national parliaments in the simplified revision procedures of the Treaties: The Treaty 
involves national parliaments in both simplified revision procedures, one of them introducing 
“general passerelles” to move from unanimity voting to qualified majority voting in the Council 
for all policy areas except defence.  
1) Art. 48.6 TEU: National parliaments have the same role that they had in the ordinary 
revision procedure under the art. 48.2 TEU prior to the Lisbon reforms, i.e., they ratify 
                                                             
2 Eighteen votes out of a total of fifty‐four votes. Each parliament is allocated two votes, which yields a total of fifty‐
four votes in an EU of 27 Member States. 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changes to the Treaties in accordance with the constitutional requirements of their 
respective Member States. 
2) Art. 48.7 TEU: As in the case of family law legislation (see above), national parliaments 
have the right to participate in the use of the general passerelle for the revision of the 
Treaties. The European Council may decide by unanimity, with the consent of the EP, to 
switch the voting rule from unanimity to a qualified majority in a given policy area, or to 
switch from a special legislative procedure to the ordinary procedure. In such cases, the 
European Council must notify its intention to the national parliaments. If no parliament 
vetoes the initiative within six months, the decision can be adopted. Hence, the Lisbon 
Treaty has This veto point is intended to prevent abuses by the heads of State or 
Government, who otherwise might potentially have used article 48.7 to promote Treaty 
reforms while avoiding domestic ratification processes. In some cases, such as in Germany, 
this veto power has been complemented by some additional control powers at the national 
level. 
5) Other issues: Among other rights, the national parliaments have been given the right to be 
notified of applications for accession to the Union (art. 49 TEU), the right to take part in inter-
parliamentary cooperation between national parliaments and the EP (Protocol no.1), and the 
right to be informed by the Commission on proposals based on the flexibility clause (art. 352.2 
TFEU). 
Over time, national parliaments have been concerned that part of their legislative powers were 
progressively reallocated to their governments, especially since the latter essentially control the 
decisions of the Council. Some Member States have therefore started to regulate this situation at the 
national level in order to promote better control by the parliaments of European legislation and policies 
adopted by their respective national governments and by the EU institutions. 
To monitor the control of EU legislation and acts, national parliaments have increased their powers by 
establishing new procedures of control, especially in parliamentarian countries such the UK and the 
Nordic countries. All Member States have put in place European Affairs Committees in their 
parliaments in order to reinforce democratic control over EU matters and to ensure democratic 
accountability in the EU decision-making process. The specific arrangements adopted for detailed 
scrutiny by committees in the national Parliaments can be consulted at http://www.cosac.eu/en/info/. 
New legislation has also been adopted to adapt their parliamentary scrutiny procedures to the Lisbon 
Treaty provisions, and to improve control of EU acts and control of government positions on EU 
issues. The process of ratifying the Lisbon Treaty provided an opportunity to negotiate and enact more 
powers for the national parliaments. Some of these powers were obtained with the cooperation of 
other national institutions or Constitutional Courts (such as the German Federal Constitutional Court), 
which have recognised the need to empower national parliaments vis-à-vis the EU institutions. Indeed, 
the German Parliament required the Government to obtain its authorisation before it would agree to 
the use of the simplified treaty revision procedure laid down in article 48.7 TEU. Other countries also 
reframed their legislation to accommodate the new role assigned to national parliaments under the 
Lisbon Treaty. These countries included Austria, Estonia, France, Ireland, Spain and Sweden, among 
others. The specific reforms can be found at http://www.cosac.eu/en/info/scrutiny/countryspecific/. 
Since 1989, all national parliamentary Committees on EU Affairs, represented in the Conference of 
Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs (COSAC), have progressively strengthened their 
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collective involvement in the EU lawmaking. In the Lisbon Treaty, this inter-parliamentary cooperation 
is acknowledged for its importance in promoting the involvement of Member State Parliaments. 
According to Article 10 of Protocol 1 on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union of 
the Treaty of Lisbon, COSAC “may submit any contribution it deems appropriate for the attention of 
the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. The Conference shall in addition promote 
the exchange of information and best practice between national Parliaments and the European 
Parliament, including their special committees. It may also organize inter-parliamentary conferences on 
specific topics, in particular to debate matters of common foreign and security policy, including 
common security and defence policy. Contributions from the Conference shall not bind national 
Parliaments and shall not prejudge their positions.” These provisions lead to the involvement of 
national parliaments, organised under COSAC, in the scrutiny of the EU’s action in the area of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP). 
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